FILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTDEC 12 PM 2:53 MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA ORLANDO DIVISION

JAMES SMITH, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

CLASS COMPLAINT AND TRIAL BY JURY DEMAND

ALLIANCE CAS, LLC,

Defendant.

NATURE OF ACTION

1. Plaintiff James Smith ("Plaintiff") brings this putative class action against Defendant Alliance CAS, LLC ("Defendant") pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 *et seq.*, and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act ("FCCPA"), Fla. Stat. § 559.55 *et seq.*, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated.

JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND STANDING

2. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d), 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).

3. Venue is proper before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), where the acts and transactions giving rise to Plaintiff's action occurred in this district, where Plaintiff resides in this district, and where Defendant transacts business in this district.

4. "In determining whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact, both history and the judgment of Congress play important roles." *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549, 194 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2016), *as revised* (May 24, 2016). Congress is "well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements," thus "Congress may 'elevat[e] to

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the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, *de facto* injuries that were previously inadequate in law." *Id.* (quoting *Lujan v. Defs of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)).

5. "Without the protections of the FDCPA, Congress determined, the '[e]xisting laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to protect consumers." *Lane v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC*, No. 15 C 10446, 2016 WL 3671467, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2016) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b)). Thus, a failure to honor a consumer's right under the FDCPA constitutes an injury in fact for Article III standing. *See id.* at *3 (holding that a consumer "has alleged a sufficiently concrete injury because he alleges that [Defendant] denied him the right to information due to him under the FDCPA"); *see also Church v. Accretive Health, Inc.*, No. 15-15708, 2016 WL 3611543, at *3 (11th Cir. July 6, 2016) (holding that consumer's § 1692g claim was sufficiently concrete to satisfy injury-in-fact requirement).

6. "The FDCPA does create an informational right which did not exist prior to its enactment, and that right is tied to the harm which a consumer may suffer if not provided with that information. Consequently, the deprivation of that information is, in most cases, sufficient to confer Article III standing." *Hagy v. Demers & Adams, LLC*, No. 2:11-CV-530, 2017 WL 1134408, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2017).

7. "[E]ven though actual monetary harm is a sufficient condition to show concrete harm, it is *not* a necessary condition." *Lane*, 2016 WL 3671467 at *4 (emphasis in original).

THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

8. Congress enacted the FDCPA to "eliminate abusive debt collection practices, to ensure that debt collectors who abstain from such practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent state action to protect consumers." Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 577 (2010) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)).

9. The FDCPA is a strict liability statute. *LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners*, 601 F.3d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010). "The FDCPA typically subjects debt collectors to liability even when violations are not knowing or intentional." *Owen v. I.C. Sys., Inc.*, 629 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2011).

10. "A single violation of the Act is sufficient to subject a debt collector to liability under the Act." *Lewis v. Marinosci Law Grp.*, *P.C.*, No. 13-61676-CIV, 2013 WL 5789183, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2013).

11. The Eleventh Circuit applies the "least sophisticated consumer" standard to determine whether a debt collector's conduct violates the FDCPA. Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1175 (11th Cir. 1985). This objective standard does not consider "whether the particular plaintiff-consumer was deceived or misled; instead, the question is 'whether the 'least sophisticated consumer' would have been deceived' by the debt collector's conduct." Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1177 n.11).

THE FLORIDA CONSUMER COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

12. Similarly, the FCCPA, Florida's consumer protection statute, was enacted as a means of regulating the activities of consumer collection agencies within the state. *LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners*, 601 F.3d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010).

13. "The Consumer Collection Practices Act is a laudable legislative attempt to curb what the Legislature evidently found to be a series of abuses in the area of debtor-creditor

relations." Laughlin v. Household Bank, Ltd., 969 So. 2d 509, 512 (Fla. 1st Dist. App. 2007) (quoting Harris v. Beneficial Fin. Co. of Jacksonville, 338 So. 2d 196, 200-01 (Fla. 1976)).

14. "The FCCPA is to be construed in a manner that is protective of the consumer." *Id.* With this in mind, the FCCPA is meant to be read "in addition to the requirements and regulations of the federal act [the FDCPA]. In the event of any inconsistency between any provision of this part and any provision of the federal act, the provision which is more protective of the consumer or debtor shall prevail." Fla. Stat. § 559.552.

15. The FCCPA provides that "[i]n collecting consumer debts, no person shall . . . Claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist." Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9).

16. In addition to actual and statutory damages, the FCCPA also provides for punitive damages. "It clearly appears to have been the intent of the Legislature to provide a remedy for a class of injury where damages are difficult to prove and at the same time provide a penalty to dissuade parties . . . from engaging in collection practices which may have been heretofore tolerated industry wide." *Laughlin*, 969 So. 2d at 513 (quoting *Harris*, 338 So. 2d at 200).

PARTIES

17. Plaintiff is a natural person who at all relevant times resided in the State of Florida, County of Orange, and City of Apopka.

18. Plaintiff is a "consumer" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3).

19. Plaintiff is a "consumer" as defined by Fla. Stat. § 559.55(8).

20. Defendant is an entity who at all relevant times was engaged, by use of the mails and telephone, in the business of attempting to collect a "debt" from Plaintiff, as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) and Fla. Stat. § 559.55(6).

21. Defendant is a "debt collector" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

22. Defendant is a "debt collector" as defined by Fla. Stat. § 559.55(7).

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

23. Plaintiff is a natural person allegedly obligated to pay a debt asserted to be owed or due a creditor other than Defendant.

24. Plaintiff's alleged obligation arises from a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services that are the subject of the transaction were incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes—namely, homeowners association assessments or other charges (the "Debt").

25. Defendant uses instrumentalities of interstate commerce or the mails in a business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts.

26. Defendant regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due, or asserted to be owed or due, another.

27. In connection with the collection of the Debt, Defendant sent Plaintiff an initial written communication dated April 12, 2017.

28. Subsequently, Plaintiff's wife began communicating with Defendant via email to discuss resolution of the Debt.

29. The parties were eventually able to come to an amicable resolution of the Debt.

30. However, Defendant sent no less than twelve separate emails that represented that Defendant could charge an "Online Convenience Fee of \$5.00."

31. Plaintiff has on several occasions paid the online convenience fee of \$5.00.

32. On more than one occasion, when Plaintiff made a payment toward the Debt, Defendant has charged Plaintiff an online fee in the amount of \$7.50 in lieu of the online convenience fee of \$5.00.

33. On more than one occasion, when Plaintiff made a payment towards the Debt, Plaintiff has paid an online fee in the amount of \$7.50 in lieu of the online convenience fee of \$5.00.

34. Upon information and belief, no law expressly permits Defendant to charge Plaintiff an "Online Convenience Fee of \$5.00."

35. Upon information and belief, the agreement creating the Debt does not expressly authorize Defendant to charge Plaintiff an "Online Convenience Fee of \$5.00."

36. Upon information and belief, no law expressly permits Defendant to charge Plaintiff a convenience fee of \$7.50.

37. Upon information and belief, the agreement creating the Debt does not expressly authorize Defendant to charge Plaintiff a convenience fee of \$7.50.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

38. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all factual allegations above.

39. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated.

Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to represent the following class of individuals:

All persons in Florida from whom Defendant charged or collected a convenience fee, within one year before the date of this complaint, in connection with the collection of a consumer debt.

40. The proposed class specifically excludes the United States of America, the State of Florida, counsel for the parties, the presiding United States District Court Judge, the Judges of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the Justices of the United States Supreme Court, all officers and agents of Defendant, and all persons related to within the third degree of consanguinity or affection to any of the foregoing persons.

41. The class is averred to be so numerous that joinder of members is impracticable.

42. The exact number of class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery.

43. The class is ascertainable in that the names and addresses of all class members can be identified in business records maintained by Defendant.

44. There exists a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved that affect the parties to be represented. These common questions of law and fact predominate over questions that may affect individual class members. Such issues include, but are not limited to: (a) the existence of Defendant's identical conduct particular to the matters at issue; (b) Defendant's violations of the FDCPA and the FCCPA; (c) the availability of statutory penalties; and (d) attorneys' fees and costs.

45. Plaintiff's claims are typical of those of the class he seeks to represent.

46. The claims of Plaintiff and of the class originate from the same conduct, practice, and procedure on the part of Defendant. Thus, if brought and prosecuted individually, the claims of the members of the class would require proof of the same material and substantive facts.

47. Plaintiff possesses the same interests and has suffered the same injuries as each class member. Plaintiff asserts identical claims and seeks identical relief on behalf of the unnamed class members.

48. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class and has no interests adverse to or which directly and irrevocably conflict with the interests of other members of the class.

49. Plaintiff is willing and prepared to serve this Court and the proposed class.

50. The interests of Plaintiff are co-extensive with and not antagonistic to those of the absent class members.

51. Plaintiff has retained the services of counsel who are experienced in consumer protection claims, as well as complex class action litigation, will adequately prosecute this action, and will assert, protect and otherwise represent Plaintiff and all absent class members.

52. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) and 23(b)(1)(B). The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other members of the class who are not parties to the action or could substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.

53. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing the classes. Such incompatible standards of conduct and varying adjudications, on what would necessarily be the same essential facts, proof and legal theories, would also create and allow the existence of inconsistent and incompatible rights within the class.

54. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) in that Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making final declaratory or injunctive relief appropriate.

55. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) in that the questions of law and fact that are common to members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.

56. Moreover, a class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversies raised in this Complaint in that: (a) individual claims by the class members will be impracticable as the costs of pursuit would far exceed what any one plaintiff or class member has at stake; (b) as a result, very little litigation has commenced over the controversies alleged in this Complaint and individual members are unlikely to have an interest in prosecuting and controlling separate individual actions; and (c) the concentration of litigation of these claims in one forum will achieve efficiency and promote judicial economy.

COUNT I VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)

57. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each factual allegation above.

58. The FDCPA creates a broad, flexible prohibition against the use of misleading, deceptive, or false representations in the collection of debts. *See* 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. *See Hamilton v. United Healthcare of Louisiana, Inc.*, 310 F.3d 385, 392 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing legislative history reference to the FDCPA's general prohibitions which "will enable the courts, where appropriate, to proscribe other improper conduct which is not specifically addressed").

59. Included as an example of conduct that violates section 1692e is the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of a debt, or of any compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2).

60. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2) when falsely representing that it could charge Plaintiff a convenience fee.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment, as follows:

- a) Determining that this action is a proper class action, certifying Plaintiff as a class representative under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and designating this Complaint the operable complaint for class purposes;
- b) Adjudging that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2) with respect to Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent;
- c) Awarding Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent actual damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1);
- d) Awarding Plaintiff such additional damages as the Court may allow in the amount of \$1,000, pursuant to § 1692k(a)(2)(B)(i);
- e) Awarding all other class members such amount as the Court may allow, without regard to a minimum individual recovery, not to exceed the lesser of \$500,000 or one percent of the net worth of the debt collector, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B)(ii);
- f) Awarding Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) and Rule 23;
- g) Awarding Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent, pre-judgment and postjudgment interest as permissible by law; and
- h) Awarding such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.

COUNT II VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5)

61. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each factual allegation above.

62. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) by threatening to take, and taking, an action against Plaintiff that cannot be legally taken or that was not actually intended to be taken

when threatening to charge Plaintiff an "Online Convenience Fee of \$5.00," and when charging and collecting convenience fees of \$5.00 and \$7.50.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment, as follows:

- a) Determining that this action is a proper class action, certifying Plaintiff as a class representative under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and designating this Complaint the operable complaint for class purposes;
- b) Adjudging that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) with respect to Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent;
- c) Awarding Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent actual damages pursuant to
 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1);
- d) Awarding Plaintiff such additional damages as the Court may allow in the amount of \$1,000, pursuant to \$ 1692k(a)(2)(B)(i);
- e) Awarding all other class members such amount as the Court may allow, without regard to a minimum individual recovery, not to exceed the lesser of \$500,000 or one percent of the net worth of the debt collector, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B)(ii);
- f) Awarding Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) and Rule 23;
- g) Awarding Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent, pre-judgment and postjudgment interest as permissible by law; and
- h) Awarding such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.

COUNT III VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1)

63. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each factual allegation above.

64. The Act also prohibits the use of unfair or unconscionable means to collect debts, including, but not limited to, the attempt to collect amounts to which the debt collector is not legally entitled to collect. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692f, 1692f(1).

65. "The 'permitted by law' language of the FDCPA has been construed to mean 'an affirmative authorization, not just indulgent silence." *Champion v. Target Nat'l Bank*, No. 1:12-CV-4196-RLV, 2013 WL 8699367, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 15, 2013) (*quoting Shula v. Lawent*, No. 01 C 4883, 2002 WL 31870157, at *9 (N.D.III.Dec.23, 2002)).

66. Debt collectors may not collect any amount if either "(A) state law expressly prohibits collection of the amount or (B) the contract does not provide for collection of the amount and state law is silent." *FTC Staff Commentary on the FDCPA*, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,108 (Dec. 13, 1988)

67. "[W]hen state law does not affirmatively authorize or prohibit service charges, a service charge may only be imposed if the customer expressly agreed to it in the contract which gives rise to the debt." *Weast v. Rockport Fin., LLC*, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1022 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (citing *Pollice v. Nat'l Tax Funding, L.P.,* 225 F.3d 379, 407–08 (3d Cir. 2000); *Tuttle v. Equifax Check*, 190 F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1999)).

68. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) by attempting to collect, and collecting, an amount from Plaintiff that is not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt nor permitted by law.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment, as follows:

 a) Determining that this action is a proper class action, certifying Plaintiff as a class representative under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and designating this Complaint the operable complaint for class purposes;

- b) Adjudging that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) with respect to Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent;
- c) Awarding Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent actual damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1);
- d) Awarding Plaintiff such additional damages as the Court may allow in the amount of \$1,000, pursuant to \$ 1692k(a)(2)(B)(i);
- e) Awarding all other class members such amount as the Court may allow, without regard to a minimum individual recovery, not to exceed the lesser of \$500,000 or one percent of the net worth of the debt collector, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B)(ii);
- f) Awarding Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) and Rule 23;
- g) Awarding Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent, pre-judgment and postjudgment interest as permissible by law; and
- h) Awarding such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.

COUNT IV VIOLATION OF FLA. STAT. § 559.72(9)

69. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation above.

70. Defendant violated Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) by asserting the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist, including by representing that it could charge Plaintiff a convenience fee, and by collecting a convenience fee without such collection being authorized by contract or law.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment, as follows:

- a) Determining that this action is a proper class action, certifying Plaintiff as a class representative under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and designating this Complaint the operable complaint for class purposes;
- b) Adjudging that Defendant violated Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) with respect to Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent;
- c) Awarding Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent actual damages pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 559.77(2);
- d) Awarding Plaintiff statutory damages pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 559.77(2), in the amount of \$1,000.00;
- e) Awarding all other members of the class such amount as the court may allow, not to exceed the lesser of \$500,000 or one percent of Defendant's net worth, up to \$1,000 per class member, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 559.77(2);
- f) Awarding Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent punitive damages pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 559.77(2);
- g) Granting any equitable relief as the Court deems necessary or proper, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 559.77(2);
- h) Awarding Plaintiff reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 559.77(2) and/or Rule 23;
- i) Awarding pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as permissible by law; and
- j) Awarding such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.

TRIAL BY JURY

71. Plaintiff is entitled to and hereby demands a trial by jury.

Dated: December 6, 2017.

Respectfully submitted,

<u>/s/ Alex D. Weisberg</u> Alex D. Weisberg FBN: 0566551 Weisberg Consumer Law Group, PA Attorneys for Plaintiff 5846 S. Flamingo Rd, Ste. 290 Cooper City, FL 33330 (954) 212-2184 (866) 577-0963 fax aweisberg@afclaw.com

Correspondence address: Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC 5235 E. Southern Ave. D106-618 Mesa, AZ 85206

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CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

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I. (a) PLAINTIFFS				DEFENDANT	ſS					
James Smith				Alliance CAS, LLC						
(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Orange (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)				County of Residence of First Listed Defendant (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY) NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.						
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(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, J Alex D. Weisberg, Weisb 5846 S. Flamingo Road, (954) 337-1885	erg Consumer Law Gr	oup, P.A.		Attorneys (If Know	vn)					
II. BASIS OF JURISDI	CTION (Place an "X" in O	ne Box Only)		ZENSHIP OF		AL PARTIES				
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VI. CAUSE OF ACTION	ON 15 U.S.C. § 1692 Brief description of ca				statutes unless	diversity): 				
VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:		IS A CLASS ACTION		MAND S		CHECK YES only JURY DEMAND		complain	nt:	
VIII. RELATED CAS IF ANY	E(S) (See instructions):	JUDGE			DOCK	ET NUMBER				
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ClassAction.org

This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: <u>Alliance CAS Accused of Charging Illegal 'Convenience Fee' for Online Debt Payments</u>