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10	UNITED STATES	S DISTRICT COURT						
11	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA							
12	WESTER	WESTERN DIVISION						
13	RAEVIN DOTSON, individually, and) CASE NO.: []						
14	on behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated							
15	Plaintiff,	NOTICE OF REMOVAL						
16	V.							
17	SMASHBOX BEAUTY	}						
18	I COSMIETICS INC)						
	COSMETICS, INC.	\						
19	Defendant.							
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1 TO THE CLERK OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA:**

Please take notice that Defendant Smashbox Beauty Cosmetics, Inc. 4 ("Smashbox") by and through their undersigned attorneys, hereby remove the above-5 captioned civil action, and all claims and causes of action therein, from the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles, to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1441, 8 1446 and 1453. This Court has original jurisdiction over the action pursuant to the 9 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), for the reasons 10 stated below.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

- 1. On March 1, 2021, Plaintiff Raevin Dotson ("Plaintiff") filed this action 13 in the Superior Court for the State of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. 14 21 STCV 08235 (the "Complaint" or "Compl."). Smashbox was served on April 19, 15 2021, and has timely filed this Notice of Removal within 30 days of receipt, through **16** service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 17 | § 1446(b). See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347-18 48 (1999) ("[A] named defendant's time to remove is triggered by . . . [formal service] under state law.]").
 - 2. A copy of the Complaint and all process, pleadings, and orders served on Smashbox in the action to date are attached hereto as **Exhibits A-I**.

BACKGROUND

3. This action arises from Plaintiff's alleged purchase of Smashbox's "Studio Skin 24 Hour Hydra Foundation" and "Photo Finish Minimize Pores." (Ex. A, Compl. ¶¶ 9-10.) For purposes of this notice only, Smashbox understands that Plaintiff is referring to Studio Skin 24 Hour Hydra Foundation and Photo Finish

Defendant does not waive and expressly preserve all rights, claims, and defenses, including without limitation all defenses relating to jurisdiction, improper party, and capacity to be sued. Unless otherwise noted, all emphasis herein is added and citations, quotations and internal alterations herein are omitted.

1 Minimizes Pores Primer (collectively, the "Products"). Plaintiff alleges that Smashbox 2 | labeled and advertised the Products as "oil-free," and contends the Products contain 3 oils. (Ex. A, Compl. ¶¶ 12, 26-34.) Plaintiff alleges that as a result, Smashbox's 4 advertising is false and misleading. (*Id.* ¶¶ 23.)

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- 4. Plaintiff alleges that she is "drawn to oil-free labeling" and that 6 Smashbox's "oil free" statements "impaired Plaintiff's ability to choose type and quality of products she chose to buy." (*Id.* ¶¶ 16, 23)
- Plaintiff seeks to represent a nationwide class of "[a]ll persons within the 9 United States who purchased the Products within four years prior to the filing of this 10 Complaint through the date of class certification." (Id. \P 45.) Plaintiff also seeks to 11 represent a "subclass" of "[a] persons within California who purchased the Products 12 within four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of class 13 | certification." (*Id.* \P 46)
- 6. Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action (1) Violation of Unfair 15 Competition Law (Cal. Business & Professions Code §§ 17500 et seq.); (2) Violation 16 of Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Business & Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq.); (3) Common Law Fraud; and (4) Unjust Enrichment.

JURISDICTION AND BASIS FOR REMOVAL

- 7. This action is removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) because this is an action over which this Court has original jurisdiction.
- 8. The Court possesses original jurisdiction over this action under CAFA, 22 | 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). As such, removal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1453 and 23 | 1446, as this action: (1) involves a plaintiff class of 100 or more members; (2) at least one putative class member is a citizen of a state different from Smashbox; and (3) the amount in controversy exceeds \$5,000,000 in the aggregate, exclusive of interests and costs. See 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2) and (6); see also Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014) (explaining that "CAFA's provisions should be read broadly"). These conditions are satisfied here.

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The Plaintiff Class Consists of Over 100 Members

- 9. This action meets the CAFA definition of a class action: "any civil action 3 filed under [R]ule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute 4 or rule of judicial procedure." 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(1)(B). CAFA requires that the 5 putative class consist of at least 100 members. *Id.* § 1332(d)(6). Plaintiff claims to 6 bring this action on behalf of "all persons within the United States who purchased the 7 Products within four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of 8 class certification" and on behalf of "all persons within California who purchased the 9 Products within four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of 10 class certification." (Ex. A, Compl. ¶¶ 45-46.)
- 10. Plaintiff alleges that on information and belief "that the Class and Sub-Class include thousands, if not millions of members." (Id. ¶ 48; see also id. ¶ 47 13 (Plaintiff "believes the members number in the thousands, if not more.").) Plaintiff 14 | also alleges that "[t]he Class and Sub-Class are so numerous that the individual joinder 15 of all of their members is impractical." (*Id.* \P 48.)
- Additionally, according to Smashbox records, thousands of consumers 11. 17 have purchased the Products nationwide during the class period, as shown in the 18 Declaration of Jill Tomandl, attached as Exhibit J. (Ex. J. Declaration of Jill Tomandl ("Tomandl Decl.") ¶¶ 6-7.)
 - 12. Accordingly, the aggregate number of class members exceeds 100 persons. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B).

Sufficient Diversity of Citizenship Exists

13. Minimal diversity exists between Smashbox and the members of the 24 putative class under 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2)(A). Under CAFA, diversity of citizenship is satisfied where "any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant." 28 U.S.C. §1332 (d)(2)(A). Members of the class are defined as "persons (named or unnamed) who fall within the definition of the proposed or certified class action." *Montelongo v. RadioShack*, No. 09-01235 MMM (AJWX),

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1 2010 WL 11507995, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2010) (finding that minimal diversity 2 existed under CAFA at the time of removal when two members of the putative class 3 were not citizens of either Texas or California when the defendant was a California corporation with its principal place of business in Texas).

- 14. Smashbox is, and at all relevant times has been, a California corporation 6 with its headquarters located in Culver City, California. Accordingly, Smashbox is a citizen of California for diversity purposes. (Ex. J, Tomandl Decl. ¶ 4.)
 - 15. Plaintiff is seeking to represent a nationwide class which will "include thousands, if not millions of members." (Ex. A, Compl. ¶¶ 45, 48.) On the face of the Complaint, there are numerous putative class members who are not citizens of California.
 - 16. Furthermore, the Products have been sold to thousands of consumers in states other than California during the class period. (Ex. J, Tomandl Decl. ¶¶ 6-8.)
- 17. Therefore, there are thousands of putative class members who are not citizens of California. (Id. ¶ 8.) Because there are members of the class that are not 16 citizens of California, and Smashbox is a citizen of California, minimal diversity exists between Smashbox and the putative class under CAFA. See 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2)(A).

The Amount in Controversy Exceeds \$5,000,000

18. The amount in controversy in this action satisfies CAFA's \$5,000,000 jurisdictional threshold. Under CAFA, the claims of the individual class members are aggregated to determine if the amount in controversy exceeds the required "sum or value of \$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs." 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2). "The amount in controversy is simply an estimate of the total amount in dispute, not a prospective assessment of defendant's liability." Lewis v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 627 25 | F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010). To determine the amount in controversy, courts first look to the complaint, and "the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the class is apparently made in good faith." Id. at 399. "To meet CAFA's amount-in-controversy 28 | requirement, a defendant needs to plausibly show that it is reasonably possible that the

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1 potential liability exceeds \$5 million." Greene v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 965 F.3d 767, $2 \parallel 772$ (9th Cir. 2020). "The amount in controversy is the amount at stake in the 3 underlying litigation." *Id.* (quoting *Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores*, LLC, 840 4 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 2016)). "Amount at stake does not mean likely or probable 5 lability; rather, it refers to possible liability." Id.

- 19. Plaintiff, in her prayer for relief, requests "full restitution of all funds 7 acquired from Plaintiff and Class Members from the sale of mislabeled Class Products 8 during the relevant class period." (Ex. A, Compl. ¶ 95(d).) Therefore, for the purposes 9 of evaluating the amount in controversy, but without conceding that Plaintiff is entitled 10 to any relief, Smashbox's potential liability is plausibly the value of sales of the 11 Products during the class period.
- 20. Smashbox made nationwide sales of at least \$13 million of the Products, 13 | between March 1, 2017, and March 1, 2021, encompassing the four-year class periods 14 alleged by Plaintiff. (Ex. J., Tomandl Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. A., Compl. ¶¶ 45-46.) Less than 15 \ 2 million of the \$13 million in sales of the Products occurred in California. (Ex. J. 16 Tomandl Decl. \P 6.) Thus, in the aggregate, Smashbox's possible liability as to 17 restitution or compensatory damages far exceeds \$5 million. (Ex. A., Compl. **18** ¶¶ 95(d).)
 - 21. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims for actual damages alone (without regard to Plaintiff's claims for other relief) far exceed \$5,000,000 for purposes of establishing CAFA's amount-in-controversy requirement.

No Exception to CAFA applies

22. Although CAFA contains several exceptions, which, where applicable, **24** may prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction under CAFA, these exceptions do 25 not impose additional jurisdictional requirements. See Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., **26** 478 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he provisions set forth in §§1332(d)(3) and $27\parallel(4)$ are not part of the prima facie case for establishing minimal diversity jurisdiction **28** under CAFA, but, instead, are exceptions to jurisdiction."). Rather, it is Plaintiff's

1 burden to demonstrate that an exception to CAFA applies. *Id.* at 1023-24 (requiring 2 the party seeking remand to demonstrate the applicability of the "home state" and "local controversy" exceptions to CAFA); Marino v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 26 F.Supp.3d 949, 952 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (same). Plaintiff here will not be able to 5 demonstrate that an exception to CAFA applies. 6 OTHER PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS 7 23. The bar on removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) by a defendant that is a citizen of the state in which the action is brought does not apply. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) ("A class action may be removed to a district court of the United States . . . without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of the State in which the action is 11 brought). **12** 24. Plaintiff filed this action in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles. This action is thus properly removed to the United States 14 District Court for the Central District of California, Western Division, which includes **15** Los Angeles County within its jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§1441(a), 1446(a). **16** 25. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1446(d), a copy of this Notice of Removal is being **17**| filed with the Clerk of Court for the Superior Court for the State of California, County **18** of Los Angeles and served upon counsel for Plaintiff. **19** DATED: May 19, 2021 21 SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP 22 /s/Jason D. Russell By: 23 Attorneys for Defendant 24 SMASHBOX BEAUTY COSMETICS INC. 25 **26** 27

Exhibit A

COPY

ORIGINAL FILED Todd M. Friedman (216752) Superior Court of California 1 County of Los Angeles Adrian R. Bacon (280332) Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C. 2 MAR 01 2021 21550 Oxnard Street, Suite 780 3 erri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Ci-Woodland Hills, CA 91367 Ry: Alta Nazarvan, Denut-4 Phone: 323-306-4234 Fax: 866-633-0228 5 tfriedman@toddflaw.com 6 abacon@toddflaw.com **Attorneys for Plaintiff** 7 Attorneys for Plaintiff and all others similarly situated 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 10 Case No 21ST CV08235 RAEVIN DOTSON, individually, 11 and on behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated, 12 **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT** Plaintiff. 13 (1) Violation of Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Business & Professions VS. 14 Code §§ 17500 et seq.) and Violation of Unfair Competition SMASHBOX BEAUTY 15 Law (Cal. Business & Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq.) Common Law Fraud COSMETICS, INC., 16 Defendant. (4) Unjust Enrichment 17 18 Jury Trial Demanded 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiff RAEVIN DOTSON ("Plaintiff"), individually and on behalf of all other members of the public similarly situated, allege as follows:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS

1. This is an action for damages, injunctive relief, and any other available legal or equitable remedies, for violations of Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Business & Professions Code §§ 17500 et seq., Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Business & Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq., common law fraud, and unjust enrichment, resulting from the illegal actions of Defendant, in intentionally labeling its skincare products with false and misleading claims that they are oil-free, when Defendant's products contain numerous oils. Plaintiff alleges as follows upon personal knowledge as to herself and her own acts and experiences, and, as to all other matters, upon information and belief, including investigation conducted by her attorneys.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 2. This class action is brought pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382. All causes of action in the instant complaint arise under California statutes and common law.
- 3. This court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant, because Defendant does business within the State of California and County of Los Angeles.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

4. Venue is proper in this Court because Defendant does business *inter alia* in the county of Los Angeles and a significant portion of the conduct giving rise to Plaintiff's claims happened here.

PARTIES

- 5. Plaintiff is an individual and citizen of California who was at all relevant times residing in Reseda, California.
- 6. Defendant is a California corporation whose principal place of business is located in Culver City, California.
- 7. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant was engaged in the manufacturing, marketing, and sale of skincare products.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS

- 8. Defendant manufactures, advertises, markets, sells, and distributes skin care products throughout California and the United States under brand name "Smashbox."
- 9. During the Class Period at least the following list of products (the "Products") were advertised as oil-free when they in fact contained the listed oils:
 - a. Studio Skin 24 Hour Hydra Foundation: tocopherol acetate, dimethicone;
 - b. Photo Finish Minimize Pores: dimethicone, isododecane, tocopherol acetate;

- During the Class Period Plaintiff purchased one of each of the Products. 10.
- Plaintiff's most recent purchase was during or about November, 2020. 11.
- All of the Products contain oils, but Defendants intentionally advertise 12. and label the Products as oil-free.
- When purchasing Defendant's products Plaintiff made her purchasing 13. decision because of the labeling on the products which read "oil-free".
- The following are pictures of Defendant's products Plaintiff purchased 14. showing the oil-free labels:



- 15. At the time of Plaintiff's purchases she did not purchase similar products which did not contain oil-free labeling and generally avoids purchasing cosmetics and skincare products which do not contain oil-free labeling, because the presence of oils in her cosmetic and skincare products is a material concern to Plaintiff.
- 16. Plaintiff is drawn to oil-free labeling for multiple reasons, including but not limited to the following: Plaintiff does not like the way oil feels on her skin, Plaintiff is concerned that oils in her cosmetics and skincare products will cause her to develop blackheads and other forms of acne, Plaintiff does not like the "shiny" appearance of her face when she uses oil base cosmetics and skincare products, Plaintiff does not like the residue often left by oils, Plaintiff does not like when oil based cosmetics and skincare products become slick when interacting with perspiration, and Plaintiff uses oil-free labeling to help determine which products she should use in conjunction with other products so as to minimize any feeling of greasiness, oiliness, or other unpleasant feelings associated with using multiple cosmetic and skincare products at the same time.
- 17. All of Plaintiff's reasons for being drawn oil-free labeling are based on the same common fact that oil-free products do not contain oils.
- 18. When Plaintiff purchases oil-free products she interprets the statement "oil-free" to mean the products she is purchasing are free of oils and will not contain

any ingredients that have all of the following qualities: liquid at room temperature, more viscous but less dense than water, do not mix with water, and slick or slippery to the touch.

- 19. In other words, Plaintiff, like any reasonable consumer, understands oils to be substances that look, feel, and interact with water the way common oils, such as olive oil, vitamin e oil, or castor oil, do, and Plaintiff expected that when she bought oil-free products they would not contain any substances that can be characterized as oils based on the way they look, feel, and interact with water.
- 20. On multiple occasions using either of the Products she purchased, Plaintiff has experienced dissatisfaction with the Products due to the Products feelings oily and greasy, causing breakouts, leaving an unpleasant residue on her skin, causing eye irritation when mixed with sweat, and interacting with other skincare products she used at the same time in a way that made her skin feel oily and greasy.
- 21. Plaintiff would not have purchased Defendant's products and would have instead purchased accurately labeled oil-free products from Defendant's competitors, if she had known Defendant's products contained oils.
- 22. Persons, like Plaintiff herein, have an interest in purchasing products that do not contain false and misleading claims with regards to the inclusion of ingredients in those products.

- 23. By making false and misleading claims about the ingredients contained in their products Defendant impaired Plaintiff's ability to choose the type and quality of products she chose to buy.
- 24. Therefore, Plaintiff has been deprived of her legally-protected interest to obtain true and accurate information about his consumer products as required by law.
- 25. As a result Plaintiff has been misled into purchasing products she would not have otherwise purchased.
- 26. Oil is a term that describes a material that is both hydrophobic and lipophilic. Oil can also be classified by the polarity of the material. Oils can be wholly non-polar such as hydrocarbons, or polar such as fatty acids. Oil comprises the following chemical functional groups:¹
 - a. hydrocarbons (alkanes, alkenes) —such as squalane commonly sold as squalane oil;
 - b. triglycerides—such as glycerol tristearate also known as stearin;
 - c. esters—such as ester oil;
 - d. fatty acids—such as palmitic acid;
 - e. certain silicones—such as alkyl dimethicone
 - f. fatty alcohols-sterols like cholesterol

¹ Tony O'Lenick, Polar vs. Nonpolar oils, 2008. https://www.cosmeticsandtoiletries.com/research/chemistry/17390254.html

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
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
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All of the above functional groups can be generally characterized by 27. the same physical properties commonly observed in oils by laypersons including being less dense than water, being more viscous than water, not mixing with water, and feeling slick or slippery to the touch.

- All of the following ingredients have been named in this Complaint 28. precisely because they look like oils, feel like oils, interact with water like oils, and match the above chemical definition of oil; and therefore are substances that a reasonable consumer would not expect to be in products labeled as oil-free.
 - 29. The following is a structural diagram of dimethicone:




- -silicone(siloxane)
- Dimethicone is defined as a polysiloxane. As shown in the diagram in 30. paragraph 29 above, dimethicone contains the silicone (siloxane) functional group. It would be defined as a polar oil. The compound has a density of 0.965 g/mL, compared to water's 1g/mL.
 - The following is a structural diagram of tocopherol acetate:



-alkane

-ester

- 32. Tocopherol acetate is defined as an ester and is more commonly called vitamin E acetate. As shown in the diagram in paragraph 31 above, tocopherol acetate contains the alkane and ester functional groups. It would be defined as a polar oil. The compound has a density of 0.96 g/mL, compared to water's 1g/mL.
 - 33. The following is a structural diagram of isododecane:



-alkane

34. Isododecane is defined as a hydrocarbon. As shown in the diagram in paragraph 33 above, isododecane contains the alkane functional group. It would be defined as a non-polar oil. The compound has a density of 0.750 g/mL, compared to water's 1g/mL.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

- 35. Plaintiff purchased Defendant's products because Defendant's packaging claims that their products are oil-free.
- 36. Plaintiff would not have been able to understand that the Products contained oils without an advanced understanding of chemistry.
- 37. Furthermore, due to Defendant's intentional, deceitful practice of falsely labeling the Products as oil-fee, Plaintiff could not have known that the Products contained oils.
- 38. Plaintiff was unaware that the Products contained oils when she purchased them.
- 39. Plaintiff and the Class were deceived into paying money for products they did not want because the Products were labeled as oil free.
- 40. Worse than the lost money, Plaintiff, the Class, and Sub-Class were deprived of their protected interest to choose the type and quality of products they use on their bodies.
- 41. Defendant, and not Plaintiff, the Class, or Sub-Class, knew or should have known that the Products' express labeling stating "Oil-Free" was false, deceptive, and misleading, and that Plaintiff, the Class, and Sub-Class members would not be able to tell the Products' contained oils unless Defendant expressly told them.

42. I	Defendant	employs	professional	chemists	to create	e the	chemical
formulas of	Defendant'	s product	s. Therefore,	Defendan	t through	ı its e	employees
knew or shou	ld have kno	own that th	ne Products co	ntained oi	ls and tha	t by la	beling the
Products as o	il-free they	were dec	eiving consun	ners.			

- 43. On information and belief, Defendants through their employees did know that the Products contained oils but chose to include "oil-free" labeling because they did not believe their customers were well educated enough to know the difference.
- 44. As a result of Defendants' acts and omissions outlined above, Plaintiff has suffered concrete and particularized injuries and harm, which include, but are not limited to, the following:
 - a. Lost money;
 - b. Wasting Plaintiff's time; and
 - c. Stress, aggravation, frustration, loss of trust, loss of serenity, and loss of confidence in product labeling.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

45. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (the "Class"), defined as follows:

All persons within the United States who purchased the Products within four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through to the date of class certification.

46. Plaintiff also brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed sub-class (the "Sub-Class"), defined as follows:

All persons within California who purchased the Products within four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through to the date of class certification.

- 47. Defendants, their employees and agents are excluded from the Class and Sub-Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class and Sub-Class, but believes the members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter.
- 48. The Class and Sub-Class are so numerous that the individual joinder of all of their members is impractical. While the exact number and identities of their members are unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the Class and Sub-Class include thousands, if not millions of members. Plaintiff alleges that the class members may be ascertained by the records maintained by Defendant.
- 49. This suit is properly maintainable as a class action because the Class and Sub-Class are so numerous that joinder of their members is impractical and the

disposition of their claims in the Class Action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and the Court.

- 50. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over questions which may affect individual class members and include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following:
 - a. Whether the Defendant intentionally, negligently, or recklessly disseminated false and misleading information by including the statement "oil-free" on the front of the Products' packaging;
 - b. Whether the Class and Sub-Class members were informed of the oils contained in the Products;
 - c. Whether the Products contain oils;
 - d. Whether Defendant's conduct was unfair and deceptive;
 - e. Whether Defendant unjustly enriched itself as a result of the unlawful conduct alleged above;
 - f. Whether the statement "oil-free" is misleading or false;
 - g. Whether there should be a tolling of the statute of limitations;
 - h. Whether the Class and Sub-Class are entitled to restitution, actual damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees and costs.

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- As a resident of the United States and the State of California who 51. purchased the Products, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class and Sub-Class.
- Plaintiff has no interests adverse or antagonistic to the interests of the 52. other members of the Class and Sub-Class.
- Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members 53. of the Class and Sub-Class. Plaintiff has retained attorneys experienced in the prosecution of class actions.
- A class action is superior to other available methods of fair and efficient 54. adjudication of this controversy, since individual litigation of the claims of all Class and Sub-Class members is impracticable. Even if every Class and Sub-Class member could afford individual litigation, the court system could not. It would be unduly burdensome to the courts in which individual litigation of numerous issues would proceed. Individualized litigation would also present the potential for varying, inconsistent or contradictory judgments and would magnify the delay and expense to all parties, and to the court system, resulting from multiple trials of the same complex factual issues. By contrast, the conduct of this action as a class action presents fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and of the court system and protects the rights of each class member. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many class members

who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein.

- 55. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class and Sub-Class would create a risk of adjudications with respect to them that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other class members not parties to such adjudications or that would substantially impair or impede the ability of such non-party class members to protect their interests.
- 56. Plaintiff's claims and injuries are identical to the claims and injuries of all class and sub-class members, because all claims and injuries of all class and sub-class members are based on the same false labeling, and same legal theory. All allegations arise from the identical, false, affirmative written statements made by Defendants when they claimed the Products were oil-free, when in reality the Products contained oils.
- 57. Defendants have acted or refused to act in respect generally applicable to the Class and Sub-Class thereby making appropriate final and injunctive relief with regard to the members of the Class and Sub-Class as a whole.
- 58. The size and definition of the Class and Sub-Class can be identified through records held by retailers carrying and reselling the Products, and by Defendant's own records.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION Violation of the California False Advertising Act (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500 et seq.)

- 52. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each allegation set forth above.
- Pursuant to California Business and Professions Code section 17500, et seq., it is unlawful to engage in advertising "which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading...or...to so make or disseminate or cause to be so made or disseminated any such statement as part of a plan or scheme with the intent not to sell that personal property or those services, professional or otherwise, so advertised at the price stated therein, or as so advertised."
- 54. California Business and Professions Code section 17500, et seq.'s prohibition against false advertising extends to the use of false or misleading written statements.
- 55. Defendant misled consumers by making misrepresentations and untrue statements about the Class Products, namely, Defendant sold the Products advertised to be oil-free fully knowing the Products contained oils, and made false representations to Plaintiff and other putative class members in order to solicit these transactions.
- 56. Specifically, Defendant wrote on the packages of these Products that they were oil-free.
- 57. Defendant knew that their representations and omissions were untrue and misleading, and deliberately made the aforementioned representations and omissions in order to deceive reasonable consumers like Plaintiff and other Class Members.
- 58. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's misleading and false advertising, Plaintiff and the other Class Members have suffered injury in fact and

have lost money or property. Plaintiff reasonably relied upon Defendant's representations regarding the Products, namely that they were oil-free. In reasonable reliance on Defendant's false advertisements, Plaintiff and other Class Members purchased the Products. In turn Plaintiff and other Class Members ended up with skincare products that turned out to actually be different than advertised, and therefore Plaintiff and other Class Members have suffered injury in fact.

- 59. Plaintiff alleges that these false and misleading written representations made by Defendant constitute a "scheme with the intent not to sell that personal property or those services, professional or otherwise, so advertised at the price stated therein, or as so advertised."
- 60. Defendant advertised to Plaintiff and other putative class members, through written representations and omissions made by Defendant and its employees, that the Class Products would be oil-free.
 - 61. Defendant knew that the Class Products did in fact contain oils.
- 62. Thus, Defendant knowingly sold Class Products to Plaintiff and other putative class members that contained oils contrary to the Products packaging.
- 63. The misleading and false advertising described herein presents a continuing threat to Plaintiff and the Class Members in that Defendant persists and continues to engage in these practices, and will not cease doing so unless and until forced to do so by this Court. Defendant's conduct will continue to cause irreparable injury to consumers unless enjoined or restrained. Plaintiff is entitled to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief ordering Defendant to cease their false advertising, as well as disgorgement and restitution to Plaintiff and all Class Members Defendant's revenues associated with their false advertising, or such portion of those revenues as the Court may find equitable.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Violation of Unfair Business Practices Act (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.)

- 64. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each allegation set forth above.
- any business act or practice that is within the broad definition of the UCL. Such violations of the UCL occur as a result of unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business acts and practices. A plaintiff is required to provide evidence of a causal connection between a defendant's business practices and the alleged harm--that is, evidence that the defendant's conduct caused or was likely to cause substantial injury. It is insufficient for a plaintiff to show merely that the defendant's conduct created a risk of harm. Furthermore, the "act or practice" aspect of the statutory definition of unfair competition covers any single act of misconduct, as well as ongoing misconduct.

UNFAIR

- 66. California Business & Professions Code § 17200 prohibits any "unfair ... business act or practice." Defendant's acts, omissions, misrepresentations, and practices as alleged herein also constitute "unfair" business acts and practices within the meaning of the UCL in that its conduct is substantially injurious to consumers, offends public policy, and is immoral, unethical, oppressive, and unscrupulous as the gravity of the conduct outweighs any alleged benefits attributable to such conduct. There were reasonably available alternatives to further Defendant's legitimate business interests, other than the conduct described herein. Plaintiff reserves the right to allege further conduct which constitutes other unfair business acts or practices. Such conduct is ongoing and continues to this date.
 - 67. In order to satisfy the "unfair" prong of the UCL, a consumer must

show that the injury: (1) is substantial; (2) is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition; and, (3) is not one that consumers themselves could reasonably have avoided.

- 68. Here, Defendant's conduct has caused and continues to cause substantial injury to Plaintiff and members of the Class. Plaintiff and members of the Class have suffered injury in fact due to Defendant's decision to sell them fraudulently labeled products (Class Products). Thus, Defendant's conduct has caused substantial injury to Plaintiff and the members of the Sub-Class.
- 69. Moreover, Defendant's conduct as alleged herein solely benefits Defendant while providing no benefit of any kind to any consumer. Such deception utilized by Defendant convinced Plaintiff and members of the Class that the Class Products were oil-free, in order to induce them to spend money on said Class Products. In fact, knowing that Class Products, by their objective terms contained oils, unfairly profited from their sale, in that Defendant knew that the expected benefit that Plaintiff would receive from this feature is nonexistent, when this is typically never the case in situations involving ingredients said to be excluded from a product. Thus, the injury suffered by Plaintiff and the members of the Sub-Class is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers.
- Finally, the injury suffered by Plaintiff and members of the Class and Sub-Class is not an injury that these consumers could reasonably have avoided. After Defendant, falsely represented that Class Products would be oil-free, the Plaintiff, Class members, and Sub-Class Members suffered injury in fact due to Defendant's sale of Class Products to them. Defendant failed to take reasonable steps to inform Plaintiff and class members that the Class Products contained oils, including intentionally mislabeling the Products by labeling them as oil-free. As such, Defendant took advantage of Defendant's position of perceived power in

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order to deceive Plaintiff and the Class members to purchase products containing oils. Therefore, the injury suffered by Plaintiff and members of the Class is not an injury which these consumers could reasonably have avoided.

Thus, Defendant's conduct has violated the "unfair" prong of 71. California Business & Professions Code § 17200.

FRAUDULENT

- California Business & Professions Code § 17200 prohibits any 72. "fraudulent ... business act or practice." In order to prevail under the "fraudulent" prong of the UCL, a consumer must allege that the fraudulent business practice was likely to deceive members of the public.
- The test for "fraud" as contemplated by California Business and 73. Professions Code § 17200 is whether the public is likely to be deceived. Unlike common law fraud, a § 17200 violation can be established even if no one was actually deceived, relied upon the fraudulent practice, or sustained any damage.
- Here, not only were Plaintiff and the Class members likely to be 74. deceived, but these consumers were actually deceived by Defendant. deception is evidenced by the fact that Plaintiff agreed to purchase Class Products under the basic assumption that they were oil-free even though the Products contained oils. Plaintiff's reliance upon Defendant's deceptive statements is reasonable due to the unequal bargaining powers of Defendant and Plaintiff. For the same reason, it is likely that Defendant's fraudulent business practice would deceive other members of the public.
- As explained above, Defendant deceived Plaintiff and other Class 75. Members by representing the Class Products as oil-free when the Products contained oils.
 - Thus, Defendant's conduct has violated the "fraudulent" prong of 76.

California Business & Professions Code § 17200.

UNLAWFUL

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- California Business and Professions Code Section 17200, et seq. 77. prohibits "any unlawful...business act or practice."
- As explained above, Defendant deceived Plaintiff and other Class 78. Members by representing the Class Products as oil-free, when the Products contained oils.
- Defendant used false advertising, marketing, and misrepresentations 79. to induce Plaintiff and Class Members to purchase the Class Products, in violation of California Business and Professions Code Section 17500, et seq. Had Defendant not falsely advertised, marketed or misrepresented the Class Products, Plaintiff and Class Members would not have purchased the Class Products. Defendant's conduct therefore caused and continues to cause economic harm to Plaintiff and Class Members.
- These representations by Defendant are therefore an "unlawful" 80. business practice or act under Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et seq.
- Defendant has thus engaged in unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent 81. business acts entitling Plaintiff and Class Members to judgment and equitable relief against Defendant, as set forth in the Prayer for Relief. Additionally, pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17203, Plaintiff and Class Members seek an order requiring Defendant to immediately cease such acts of unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices and requiring Defendant to correct its actions.

THRID CAUSE OF ACTION **COMMON LAW FRAUD**

- Plaintiff incorporates all of the allegations and statements made 82. above as if fully reiterated herein.
 - 83. Through its false statements on the Products' packaging that the

Products are oil-free, Defendant made false statements of material fact.

- 84. At the time Defendant made its statements that the Products were oil-free to Plaintiff, it knew, or reasonably should have known, that the statements described above were false.
- 85. At the time Defendant made the statement to Plaintiff, it intended to induce Plaintiff to purchase the Products.
- 86. Plaintiff relied upon the truth of the statements described above and purchased the Products, only to find that the Products contain oils.
- 87. As a result of their reasonable reliance upon Defendant's false statements of material fact as set forth above, Plaintiff and other members of the Class and Sub-Class have suffered concrete and particularized injuries, harm and damages which include, but are not limited to, the loss of money spent on products they did not want to buy, and stress, aggravation, frustration, inconvenience, emotional distress, mental anguish, and similar categories of damages.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION UNJUST ENRICHMENT

- 88. Plaintiff incorporates all of the allegations and statements made above as if fully reiterated herein.
- 89. Plaintiff conferred monetary benefits to Defendant by purchasing the Products.
- 90. Defendant has been unjustly enriched by retaining the revenues derived from Plaintiff's purchase of the Products based on the false statement that the Products are oil-free.
- 91. Defendant's retention of the revenue it received from Plaintiff, the Class, and the Sub-Class is unjust and inequitable because Defendant's false statements caused injuries to Plaintiff, the Class, and the Sub-Class, because they

would not have purchased the Products if they knew the Products contained oils. 1 Defendant's unjust retention of the benefits conferred on it by 92. 2 Plaintiff, the Class, and the Sub-Class entitles the Plaintiff, the Class, and the 3 Sub-Class to restitution of the money they paid to Defendant for the Products. 4 **MISCELLANEOUS** 5 Plaintiff and Class Members allege that they have fully complied with 93. 6 all contractual and other legal obligations and fully complied with all conditions 7 precedent to bringing this action or all such obligations or conditions are excused. 8 REOUEST FOR JURY TRIAL 9 Plaintiff requests a trial by jury as to all claims so triable. 94. 10 PRAYER FOR RELIEF 11 Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class, requests the following 12 95. relief: 13 An order certifying the Class and appointing Plaintiff as (a) 14 Representative of the Class and Sub-class; 15 An order certifying the undersigned counsel as Class and Sub-(a) 16 Class Counsel; 17 An order requiring Defendant, at its own cost, to notify all Class (b) 18 Members of the unlawful and deceptive conduct herein; 19 (c) An order requiring Defendant to engage in corrective 20 advertising regarding the conduct discussed above; 21 Actual damages suffered by Plaintiff and Class Members as (d) 22 applicable or full restitution of all funds acquired from Plaintiff 23 and Class Members from the sale of mislabeled Class Products 24 during the relevant class period; 25 Punitive damages, as allowable, in an amount determined by the (e) 26 27

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Court or jury; 1 (f) Any and all statutory enhanced damages; 2 All reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and costs provided (g) 3 by statute, common law or the Court's inherent power; 4 Pre- and post-judgment interest; and (h) 5 All other relief, general or special, legal and equitable, to which (i) 6 Plaintiff and Class Members may be justly entitled as deemed 7 by the Court. 8 9 Respectfully submitted, Dated: March 1, 2021 10 LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, PC 11 12 By: 13 TODD M. FRIEDMAN, ESQ. Attorney for Plaintiff 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

ClassAction.org

This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: <u>Class Action Claims' Oil-Free' Smashbox Beauty Cosmetics Skincare Products Contain Oil</u>