

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JOSIE BADGER and ANGELA HUNTER,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

ADVANCE STORES COMPANY INC. d/b/a
ADVANCE AUTO PARTS,

Defendant.

Case No.

FILED ELECTRONICALLY

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

COMES NOW, Josie Badger and Angela Hunter (collectively “Plaintiffs”), on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated and allege as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated against Advance Stores Company Inc. d/b/a Advance Auto Parts (“Defendant”), alleging violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 *et seq.*, (the “ADA”) and its implementing regulations, in connection with accessibility barriers in the parking lots and paths of travel at various public accommodations owned, operated, controlled and/or leased by Defendant (“Defendant’s facilities”).

2. Plaintiff Josie Badger (“Plaintiff Badger”) has a mobility disability and is limited in the major life activity of walking, which has caused her to be dependent upon a wheelchair for mobility.

3. Plaintiff Angela Hunter (“Plaintiff Hunter”) was in a serious car accident approximately twenty-five years ago. Since then she has had a mobility disability and is limited in the major life activity of walking, which has caused her to be dependent upon a wheelchair for mobility.

4. Plaintiffs have visited Defendant’s facilities and were denied full and equal access as a result of Defendant’s inaccessible parking lots and paths of travel.

5. Plaintiffs’ experiences are not isolated—Defendant has systematically discriminated against individuals with mobility disabilities by implementing policies and practices that consistently violate the ADA’s accessibility guidelines and routinely result in access barriers at Defendant’s facilities.

6. In fact, numerous facilities owned, controlled and/or operated by Defendant have parking lots and paths of travel that are inaccessible to individuals who rely on wheelchairs for mobility, demonstrating that the centralized decision making Defendant employs with regard to the design, construction, alteration, maintenance and operation of its facilities causes access barriers, and/or allows them to develop and persist at Defendant’s facilities.

7. Unless Defendant is required to remove the access barriers described below, and required to change its policies and practices so that access barriers do not reoccur at Defendant’s facilities, Plaintiffs and the proposed Class will continue to be denied full and equal access to those facilities as described, and will be deterred from fully using Defendant’s facilities.

8. The ADA expressly contemplates injunctive relief aimed at modification of a policy or practice that Plaintiffs seek in this action. In relevant part, the ADA states:

[i]n the case of violations of...this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities....Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the...modification of a policy....

42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2).

9. Consistent with 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction requiring:

- a) that Defendant remediate all parking and path of travel access barriers at its facilities, consistent with the ADA;
- b) that Defendant change its corporate policies and practices so that the parking and path of travel access barriers at its facilities do not reoccur; and,
- c) that Plaintiffs' representatives shall monitor Defendant's facilities to ensure that the injunctive relief ordered pursuant to Paragraph 5(a) and 5(b) has been implemented and will remain in place.

10. Plaintiffs' claims for permanent injunctive relief are asserted as class claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(2) was specifically intended to be utilized in civil rights cases where the Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief for their own benefit and the benefit of a class of similarly situated individuals. To that end, the note to the 1996 amendment to Rule 23 states:

Subdivision(b)(2). This subdivision is intended to reach situations where a party has taken action or refused to take action with respect to a class, and final relief of an injunctive nature or a corresponding declaratory nature, settling the legality of the behavior with respect to the class as a whole, is appropriate....Illustrative are various actions in the civil rights field where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose members are incapable of specific enumeration.

THE ADA AND ITS IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS

11. The ADA was enacted over a quarter century ago and is intended to "provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).

12. The ADA broadly protects the rights of individuals with disabilities in employment, access to State and local government services, places of public accommodation, transportation, and other important areas of American life.

13. Title III of the ADA generally prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities in the full and equal enjoyment of public accommodations, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), and prohibits places of public accommodation, either directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, from outright denying individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in a place of public accommodation, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i), or denying individuals with disabilities the opportunity to fully and equally participate in a place of public accommodation, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii).

14. Title III further prohibits places of public accommodation from utilizing methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(D).

15. Title III and its implementing regulations define discrimination to include the following:

- a) Failure to remove architectural barriers when such removal is readily achievable for places of public accommodation that existed prior to January 26, 1992, 28 CFR § 36.304(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv);
- b) Failure to design and construct places of public accommodation for first occupancy after January 26, 1993, that are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, 28 C.F.R. § 36.401 and 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1);
- c) For alterations to public accommodations made after January 26, 1992, failure to make alterations so that the altered portions of the public accommodation are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, 28 C.F.R. § 36.402 and 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(2); and
- d) Failure to maintain those features of public accommodations that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities, 28 C.F.R. § 36.211.

16. The remedies and procedures set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) are provided to any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability or who has reasonable grounds for believing that such person is about to be subjected to discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12183. 42 U.S.C. 12188(a)(1).

17. The ADA also provides for specific injunctive relief, which includes the following:

In the case of violations of sections 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) and section 12183(a) of this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities to the extent required by this subchapter. Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include...modification of a policy...to the extent required by this subchapter.

42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2); 28 C.F.R. § 36.501(b).

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

18. This Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 12188.

19. Plaintiffs' claims asserted herein arose in this judicial district and Defendant does substantial business in this judicial district.

20. Venue in this judicial district is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) in that this is the judicial district in which a substantial part of the events and/or omissions at issue occurred.

PARTIES

21. Plaintiff Badger is and, at all times relevant hereto, was a resident of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. As described above, as a result of her disability, Plaintiff Badger relies upon a wheelchair for mobility. She is therefore a member of a protected class under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) and the regulations implementing the ADA set forth at 28 CFR §§ 36.101 *et seq.*

22. Plaintiff Hunter is and, at all times relevant hereto, was a resident of the State of Ohio. As described above, as a result of her disability, Plaintiff Hunter relies upon a wheelchair for mobility. She is therefore a member of a protected class under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) and the regulations implementing the ADA set forth at 28 CFR §§ 36.101 *et seq.*

23. Defendant is one of the nation's largest auto-parts dealers. Defendant is headquartered at 5008 Airport Road, Roanoke, Virginia 24012.

24. Defendant is a public accommodation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §12181(7).

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

I. Plaintiffs Have Been Denied Full and Equal Access to Defendant's Facilities.

25. Plaintiffs have visited Defendant's property located at 8716 Norwin Avenue, Irwin, PA, where they experienced unnecessary difficulty and risk due to excessive slopes in Defendant's parking facilities and improper or missing signage.

26. Plaintiff Badger also has visited Defendant's property located at 6489 Lincoln Highway E., Jeanette, Pa, where she experienced unnecessary difficulty and risk due to excessive slopes in Defendant's parking facilities and improper or missing signage.

27. As a result of Defendant's non-compliance with the ADA, Plaintiffs' ability to access and safely use Defendant's facilities has been significantly impeded.

28. Plaintiff Badger lives north of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in the Ellwood City/Wampum area and travels throughout the region frequently. Plaintiff Badger has been to Defendant's location identified above within the last year, and intends to return to property.

29. Plaintiff Hunter travels to the Pittsburgh area frequently to visit friends. Additionally, she has a friend who will be opening a restaurant in the area that she intends on

visiting often. Plaintiff Hunter has been to Defendant's location identified above within the last year, and intends to return to property.

30. Furthermore, Plaintiffs intend to return to Defendant's facilities to ascertain whether those facilities remain in violation of the ADA.

31. Plaintiffs will be deterred from returning to and fully and safely accessing Defendant's facilities, however, so long as Defendant's facilities remain non-compliant, and so long as Defendant continues to employ the same policies and practices that have led, and in the future will lead, to inaccessibility at its facilities.

32. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiffs will continue to be unable to fully and safely access Defendant's facilities in violation of their rights under the ADA.

33. As individuals with mobility disabilities who are dependent upon wheelchairs, Plaintiffs are directly interested in whether public accommodations, like Defendant, have architectural barriers that impede full accessibility to those accommodations by individuals with mobility-related disabilities.

II. Defendant Repeatedly Denies Individuals With Disabilities Full and Equal Access to its Facilities.

34. Defendant, as the owner, controller and/or operator of its facilities, employs centralized decision making processes with regard to the design, construction, alteration, maintenance and operation of its facilities.

35. For example, and on information and belief, when Defendant constructs or alters facilities, it makes centralized decisions about the design of their construction and alteration projects and how the construction and alteration should be completed, including, but not limited to, what design guidelines to use, what architects and contractors to hire, how the contract language governing the relationship between its architects and contractors should read, approval of design

guidelines and build-out plans, overseeing and/or completing construction and alteration, and/or how post-construction/alteration ADA compliance checks, if any, are conducted.

36. Further, on information and belief, Defendant, as the centralized decision-maker, determines what processes are employed in order to maintain all of the facilities it owns, operates and/or controls, including but not limited to, how, or if, its employees or other third parties monitor the parking lots and paths of travel.

37. To date, Defendant's centralized design, construction, alteration, maintenance and operational policies and practices have systematically and routinely violated the ADA by designing, constructing and altering facilities so that they are not readily accessible and usable, by failing to remove architectural barriers, and by failing to maintain and operate facilities so that the accessible features of Defendant's facilities are maintained.

38. On Plaintiffs' behalf, investigators examined multiple locations owned, controlled, and/or operated by Defendant, and found the following violations, which are illustrative of the fact that Defendant implements policies and practices that routinely result in accessibility violations:

a) 85 Tarentum Bridge Road, New Kensington, PA

- i. The surfaces of one or more purportedly accessible parking spaces had slopes exceeding 2.1%;
- ii. The surfaces of one or more access aisles had slopes exceeding 2.1%; and,
- iii. A curb ramp located on the route to the building entrance had a running slope exceeding 8.3%.

b) 2405 Freeport Road, Pittsburgh, PA

- i. The surfaces of one or more purportedly accessible parking spaces had slopes exceeding 2.1%;
- ii. The surfaces of one or more access aisles had slopes exceeding 2.1%; and,
- iii. A curb ramp located on the route to the building entrance had a running slope exceeding 8.3%; and,

- iv. One or more signs designating spaces as “accessible” were mounted less than 60 inches above the finished surface of the parking area.

c) 12955 Frankstown Road, Pittsburgh, PA

- i. The surfaces of one or more purportedly accessible parking spaces had slopes exceeding 2.1%;
- ii. A curb ramp projected into the access aisle;
- iii. No spaces were designated as “van accessible” at one or more groups of purportedly accessible parking spaces; and,
- iv. One or more signs designating spaces as “accessible” were mounted less than 60 inches above the finished surface of the parking area.

d) 6489 Lincoln Highway E., Jeanette, PA

- i. The surfaces of one or more purportedly accessible parking spaces had slopes exceeding 2.1%;
- ii. The surfaces of one or more access aisles had slopes exceeding 2.1%; and,
- iii. A curb ramp located on the route to the building entrance had a running slope exceeding 8.3%; and,
- iv. No spaces were designated as “van accessible” at one or more groups of purportedly accessible parking spaces.

e) 8716 Norwin Avenue, Irwin, PA

- i. The surfaces of one or more purportedly accessible parking spaces had slopes exceeding 2.1%;
- ii. The surfaces of one or more access aisles had slopes exceeding 2.1%;
- iii. One or more purportedly accessible spaces were not marked with required signs; and
- iv. No spaces were designated as “van accessible” at one or more groups of purportedly accessible parking spaces.

f) 805 West Marketview Drive, Champaign, IL

- i. The surfaces of one or more purportedly accessible parking spaces had slopes exceeding 2.1%;
- ii. The surfaces of one or more access aisles had slopes exceeding 2.1%;

- iii. A portion of the route to the store entrance had a cross slope exceeding 2.1%;
- iv. No spaces were designated as “van accessible” at one or more groups of purportedly accessible parking spaces; and
- v. One or more signs designating spaces as “accessible” were mounted less than 60 inches above the finished surface of the parking area.

g) 403 North Mattis Avenue, Champaign, IL

- i. The surfaces of one or more purportedly accessible parking spaces had slopes exceeding 2.1%;
- ii. The surfaces of one or more access aisles had slopes exceeding 2.1%;
- iii. No spaces were designated as “van accessible” at one or more groups of purportedly accessible parking spaces; and
- iv. One or more signs designating spaces as “accessible” were mounted less than 60 inches above the finished surface of the parking area.

h) 924 Carlyle Avenue, Belleville, IL

- i. The surfaces of one or more purportedly accessible parking spaces had slopes exceeding 2.1%; and
- ii. No spaces were designated as “van accessible” at one or more groups of purportedly accessible parking spaces.

i) 525 Lincoln Highway, Fairview Heights, IL

- i. The surfaces of one or more purportedly accessible parking spaces had slopes exceeding 2.1%;
- ii. The surfaces of one or more access aisles had slopes exceeding 2.1%; and
- iii. No spaces were designated as “van accessible” at one or more groups of purportedly accessible parking spaces.

j) 1604 Camp Jackson Road, Cahokia, IL

- i. No spaces designated as accessible; and
- ii. A curb ramp projected into an access aisle.

k) 5430 Springboro Pike, Dayton, OH

- i. The surfaces of one or more purportedly accessible parking spaces had slopes exceeding 2.1%;
- ii. A curb ramp projected into an access aisle; and
- iii. One or more signs designating spaces as “accessible” were mounted less than 60 inches above the finished surface or the parking area.

l) 8107 Springboro Pike, Miamisburg, OH

- i. The surfaces of one or more purportedly accessible parking spaces had slopes exceeding 2.1%;
- ii. The surfaces of one or more access aisles had slopes exceeding 2.1%;
- iii. The landing at the top of the curb ramp had a slope exceeding 2.1%;
- iv. No spaces were designated as “van accessible” at one or more groups of purportedly accessible parking spaces; and
- v. One or more signs designating spaces as “accessible” were mounted less than 60 inches above the finished surface or the parking area.

m) 2636 S Smithville Road, Dayton, OH

- i. A curb ramp projected into an access aisle;
- ii. No spaces were designated as “van accessible” at one or more groups of purportedly accessible parking spaces; and
- iii. One or more signs designating spaces as “accessible” were mounted less than 60 inches above the finished surface or the parking area.

n) 815 S Main Street, Englewood, OH

- i. The surfaces of one or more purportedly accessible parking spaces had slopes exceeding 2.1%;
- ii. The surfaces of one or more access aisles had slopes exceeding 2.1%;
- iii. A curb ramp located on the route to the building entrance had a running slope exceeding 8.3%;
- iv. One or more purportedly accessible spaces were not marked with required signs;
- v. No spaces were designated as “van accessible” at one or more groups of purportedly accessible parking spaces; and

vi. No access aisle was provided adjacent to one or more purportedly accessible spaces.

o) 1246 Kaufman Avenue, Fairborn, OH

i. The surfaces of one or more purportedly accessible parking spaces had slopes exceeding 2.1%;

ii. The surfaces of one or more access aisles had slopes exceeding 2.1%; and

iii. No spaces were designated as “van accessible” at one or more groups of purportedly accessible parking spaces.

p) 434 Woodman Drive, Dayton, OH

i. A curb ramp projected into an access aisle;

ii. The surfaces of one or more purportedly accessible parking spaces had slopes exceeding 2.1%; and

iii. No spaces were designated as “van accessible” at one or more groups of purportedly accessible parking spaces.

q) 911 3rd Street South, Nampa, ID

i. The surfaces of one or more purportedly accessible parking spaces had slopes exceeding 2.1%;

ii. The surfaces of one or more access aisles had slopes exceeding 2.1%; and

iii. No spaces were designated as “van accessible” at one or more groups of purportedly accessible parking spaces.

r) 303 Franklin Road, Meridian, ID

i. The surfaces of one or more purportedly accessible parking spaces had slopes exceeding 2.1%;

ii. The surfaces of one or more access aisles had slopes exceeding 2.1%; and

iii. No spaces were designated as “van accessible” at one or more groups of purportedly accessible parking spaces.

39. The fact that individuals with mobility-related disabilities are denied full and equal access to numerous of Defendant’s facilities, and the fact that each of these facilities deny access by way of inaccessible parking facilities, is evidence that the inaccessibility Plaintiffs experienced

is not isolated, but rather, caused by Defendant's systemic disregard for the rights of individuals with disabilities.

40. Defendant's systemic access violations demonstrate that Defendant either employs policies and practices that fail to design, construct and alter its facilities so that they are readily accessible and usable, and/or that Defendant employs maintenance and operational policies and practices that are unable to maintain accessibility.

41. Advance Stores Company Inc. d/b/a Advance Auto Parts has been the defendant in at least two prior lawsuits asserting claims under the ADA in connection with accessibility barriers in its parking facilities: *Damian Zipf v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc.*, Case No. 14-cv-1088 (W.D.Pa.) and *Michele Van Hise v. Advance Stores Company, Inc. d/b/a Advance Auto Parts*, Case No. 15-cv-2284 (C.D.Ill.).

42. Despite this past litigation, the ADA violations identified in Paragraph 38 above remain. This is simply further support for Plaintiffs' assertion that Defendant employs policies and practices that are incapable of maintaining accessibility.

43. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek an injunction to remove the barriers currently present at Defendant's facilities and an injunction to modify the policies and practices that have created or allowed, and will create and allow, inaccessibility to affect Defendant's network of facilities.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

44. Plaintiffs bring this class action, pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of themselves and the following nationwide class: all wheelchair users who have attempted, or will attempt, to utilize the parking facilities at all locations within the United States for which Defendant owns and/or controls the parking facilities.

45. Numerosity: The class described above is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court, and will facilitate judicial economy.

46. Typicality: Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of the Plaintiffs and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct.

47. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting members of the class in that they all have been and/or are being denied their civil rights to full and equal access to, and use and enjoyment of, Defendant's facilities and/or services due to Defendant's failure to make their facilities fully accessible and independently usable as above described.

48. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the class because their interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the class. Plaintiffs will fairly, adequately, and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the class and have no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Plaintiffs have retained counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation, generally, and who possess specific expertise in the context of class litigation under the ADA.

49. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiffs and the Class as a whole.

SUBSTANTIVE VIOLATION

50. The allegations contained in the previous paragraphs are incorporated by reference.

51. Defendant's facilities were altered, designed, or constructed, after the effective date of the ADA.

52. Defendant's facilities are required to be altered, designed, and constructed so that they are readily accessible to and usable by individuals who use wheelchairs. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a).

53. Further, the accessible features of Defendant's facilities, which include the parking lots and paths of travel, are required to be maintained so that they are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with mobility disabilities. 28 U.S.C. § 36.211.

54. The architectural barriers described above demonstrate that Defendant's facilities were not altered, designed, or constructed in a manner that causes them to be readily accessible to and usable by individuals who use wheelchairs, and/or that Defendant's facilities were not maintained so as to ensure that they remained accessible to and usable by individuals who use wheelchairs.

55. Furthermore, the architectural barriers described above demonstrate that Defendant has failed to remove barriers, as required by 42 U.S.C. Section 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).

56. Defendant's repeated and systemic failures to design, construct and alter facilities so that they are readily accessible and usable, to remove architectural barriers, and to maintain the accessible features of their facilities constitute unlawful discrimination on the basis of a disability in violation of Title III of the ADA.

57. Defendant's facilities are required to comply with the Department of Justice's 2010 Standards for Accessible Design, or in some cases the 1991 Standards 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1); 28 C.F.R. § 36.406; 28 C.F.R., pt. 36, app. A.

58. Defendant is required to provide individuals who use wheelchairs full and equal enjoyment of its facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).

59. Defendant has failed, and continues to fail, to provide individuals who use wheelchairs with full and equal enjoyment of its facilities.

60. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiffs and the Class in that it has failed to make its facilities fully accessible to, and independently usable by, individuals who use wheelchairs in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) as described above.

61. Defendant's conduct is ongoing and continuous, and Plaintiffs have been harmed by Defendant's conduct.

62. Unless Defendant is restrained from continuing their ongoing and continuous course of conduct, Defendant will continue to violate the ADA and will continue to inflict injury upon Plaintiffs and the Class.

63. Given that Defendant has not complied with the ADA's requirements to make its facilities fully accessible to, and independently usable by, individuals who use wheelchairs, Plaintiffs invokes their statutory rights to declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as costs and attorneys' fees.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the members of the class, pray for:

- a. A declaratory judgment that Defendant is in violation of the specific requirements of Title III of the ADA described above, and the relevant implementing regulations of the ADA, in that Defendant's facilities, as described above, are not fully accessible to, and independently usable by, individuals who use wheelchairs;

- b. A permanent injunction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and 28 CFR § 36.501(b) which directs Defendant to: (i) take all steps necessary to remove the architectural barriers described above and to bring its facilities into full compliance with the requirements set forth in the ADA, and its implementing regulations, so that the facilities are fully accessible to, and independently usable by, individuals who use wheelchairs; (ii) that Defendant change its corporate policies and practices to prevent the reoccurrence of access barriers post-remediation; and, (iii) that Plaintiffs shall monitor Defendant's facilities to ensure that the injunctive relief ordered above remains in place.
- c. An Order certifying the class proposed by Plaintiffs, and naming Plaintiffs as class representatives and appointing their counsel as class counsel;
- d. Payment of costs of suit;
- e. Payment of reasonable attorneys' fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205 and 28 CFR § 36.505; and,
- f. The provision of whatever other relief the Court deems just, equitable and appropriate.

Dated: December 16, 2016

Respectfully Submitted,

By: /s/ Benjamin J. Sweet
Benjamin J. Sweet (PA 87338)
R. Bruce Carlson (PA 56657)
Stephanie K. Goldin (PA 202865)
**CARLSON LYNCH SWEET
KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP**
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(f) 412.231.0246

CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS
Josie Badger and Angela Hunter
(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Lawrence
(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number)
Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela & Carpenter LLP, 1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor, Pittsburgh, PA 15222

DEFENDANTS
Advance Stores Company Inc. d/b/a Advance Auto Parts
County of Residence of First Listed Defendant
NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.
Attorneys (If Known)

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only)
1 U.S. Government Plaintiff
2 U.S. Government Defendant
3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party)
4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff and One Box for Defendant)
PTF DEF
Citizen of This State 1 1
Citizen of Another State 2 2
Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country 3 3
Incorporated or Principal Place of Business In This State 4 4
Incorporated and Principal Place of Business In Another State 5 5
Foreign Nation 6 6

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

Table with 5 columns: CONTRACT, REAL PROPERTY, TORTS, CIVIL RIGHTS, PRISONER PETITIONS, FORFEITURE/PENALTY, LABOR, IMMIGRATION, BANKRUPTCY, SOCIAL SECURITY, FEDERAL TAX SUITS, OTHER STATUTES. Includes various legal categories like Insurance, Personal Injury, Labor, etc.

V. ORIGIN (Place an "X" in One Box Only)
1 Original Proceeding
2 Removed from State Court
3 Remanded from Appellate Court
4 Reinstated or Reopened
5 Transferred from Another District (specify)
6 Multidistrict Litigation - Transfer
8 Multidistrict Litigation - Direct File

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION
Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
Brief description of cause:
Public accommodation violation

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:
CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P. DEMAND \$
CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint: JURY DEMAND: Yes No

VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY
(See instructions): JUDGE Judge Mark R. Hornak DOCKET NUMBER 14-cv-1455

DATE 12/16/2016 SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD /s/ Benjamin J. Sweet

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY RECEIPT # AMOUNT APPLYING IFP JUDGE MAG. JUDGE

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Save As...

Reset

JS 44A REVISED June, 2009
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
THIS CASE DESIGNATION SHEET MUST BE COMPLETED

PART A

This case belongs on the (Erie Johnstown Pittsburgh) calendar.

1. **ERIE CALENDAR** - If cause of action arose in the counties of Crawford, Elk, Erie, Forest, McKean, Venang or Warren, OR any plaintiff or defendant resides in one of said counties.
2. **JOHNSTOWN CALENDAR** - If cause of action arose in the counties of Bedford, Blair, Cambria, Clearfield or Somerset OR any plaintiff or defendant resides in one of said counties.
3. Complete if on **ERIE CALENDAR**: I certify that the cause of action arose in _____ County and that the _____ resides in _____ County.
4. Complete if on **JOHNSTOWN CALENDAR**: I certify that the cause of action arose in _____ County and that the _____ resides in _____ County.

PART B (You are to check ONE of the following)

1. This case is related to Number 14-cv-1455 . Short Caption Heinzl v. Cracker Barrel
2. This case is not related to a pending or terminated case.

DEFINITIONS OF RELATED CASES:

CIVIL: Civil cases are deemed related when a case filed relates to property included in another suit or involves the same issues of fact or it grows out of the same transactions as another suit or involves the validity or infringement of a patent involved in another suit

EMINENT DOMAIN: Cases in contiguous closely located groups and in common ownership groups which will lend themselves to consolidation for trial shall be deemed related.

HABEAS CORPUS & CIVIL RIGHTS: All habeas corpus petitions filed by the same individual shall be deemed related. All pro se Civil Rights actions by the same individual shall be deemed related.

PART C

I. CIVIL CATEGORY (Select the applicable category).

1. Antitrust and Securities Act Cases
2. Labor-Management Relations
3. Habeas corpus
4. Civil Rights
5. Patent, Copyright, and Trademark
6. Eminent Domain
7. All other federal question cases
8. All personal and property damage tort cases, including maritime, FELA, Jones Act, Motor vehicle, products liability, assault, defamation, malicious prosecution, and false arrest
9. Insurance indemnity, contract and other diversity cases.
10. Government Collection Cases (shall include HEW Student Loans (Education), V A Overpayment, Overpayment of Social Security, Enlistment Overpayment (Army, Navy, etc.), HUD Loans, GAO Loans (Misc. Types), Mortgage Foreclosures, SBA Loans, Civil Penalties and Coal Mine Penalty and Reclamation Fees.)

I certify that to the best of my knowledge the entries on this Case Designation Sheet are true and correct

/s/ Benjamin J. Sweet

Date: December 16, 2016

ATTORNEY AT LAW

NOTE: ALL SECTIONS OF BOTH ÔŠPRU MUST BE COMPLETED BEFORE CASE CAN BE PROCESSED.

ClassAction.org

This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: [Advance Auto Parts Hit with ADA Compliance Class Action](#)
